The Work Plan from the Summit identified the Convention and its amendment as the only multilateral, legally binding agreement regarding the physical protection of nuclear material in peaceful uses. Under this model, adherence to security standards could still be assessed in bilateral consultations, but assessments would be at the systems-level, rather than the details of implementation. The provisions contained within the CPPNM are high level and focussed primarily on what nuclear material to protect and what to reportrather than how to protect, and is primarily limited to international transport. Skip to main content. Introduction The subject of nuclear security or, in the parlance of the nuclear industry, physical protection has taken on greater prominence over the last ten years since the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September demonstrated the willingness of terrorist groups to escalate to new scales of mass destruction.
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Amendment Text Scope of Application Pursuant to Article 2, the Convention applies to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in international nuclear transport. The Convention does not apply to nuclear materials used for military purposes or to those used for peaceful purposes but not in international transport.
It therefore remains a national responsibility—not subject to binding international standards. The amendment process also sought to facilitate cooperation among States and the IAEA to locate and recover stolen nuclear material.
Pursuant to Article 20, a diplomatic conference to amend and strengthen the Convention was convened in July States Parties undertake to include those offenses as extraditable offenses in every future extradition treaty to be concluded between them. The Convention also promotes international cooperation in the exchange of physical protection information.
Verification and Compliance Verification States Parties must identify and make known to each other directly or through the IAEA their central authority and point of contact having responsibility for physical protection of nuclear material and for coordinating recovery and response operations in the event of any unauthorized removal, use, or alteration of nuclear material or in the event of a credible threat thereof.
The Convention does not provide for inspections. Compliance Article 17 provides for dispute settlement procedures, but allows parties to opt out of those procedures. Reservations Several States Parties, including Argentina, Belarus, China, Cuba, Cyprus, France, Guatemala, Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, Peru, Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, and Turkey, declared that they were not bound by the provision of Article 17, paragraph 2, which provides for the submission of disputes to arbitration or their referral to the International Court of Justice in the case of an inability to resolve the dispute on the basis of negotiations between the States Parties.
Nearly participants took part, representing governments as well as civil society, academia, and other sectors. Russian speaking countries, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, and Tajikistan, participated in the workshop. After the legislation passed by the Senate in June and was signed by President Obama, John Kerry announced that the United States would actively work to secure the remaining 14 states needed for the amendment to take effect.
The attending delegations reaffirmed the importance of the CPPNM and its amendment, and 14 countries reported progress in adopting legislation to ratify the amendment. On 22 September, Singapore acceded to the Convention. Delegations from member states discussed long terms safety issues and the situation at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant in Japan.
The conference adopted Ministerial Declaration which called for improvements in global nuclear safety measures. While no specific improvements were discussed, the conference called upon the Director General to prepare an Action Plan to address nuclear safety issues. Delegates discussed and exchanged information on safety measures and good safety practices.
The document considered the Convention an essential element of the nuclear security architecture. The Work Plan from the Summit identified the Convention and its amendment as the only multilateral, legally binding agreement regarding the physical protection of nuclear material in peaceful uses. The document encouraged participating states to work towards universality where applicable, early implementation of the amendment and assist states with implementation.
The meeting focused on the implementation and entry into force of the amendment. At the NPT PrepCom, all three versions of the draft recommendations for the Review Conference sought to call upon all states that have not yet done so to accede to all relevant conventions that would strengthen nuclear safety and security, specifically on physical protection of nuclear material and facilities.
The amended CPPNM legally binds states to the protection of nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage, and transport.
It also provides for enhanced cooperation between states regarding the rapid location and recovery of stolen or smuggled nuclear materials, mitigation of radiological consequences of sabotage, and prevention of combat-related offenses. The new rules dictated by the amendments will come into effect once two-thirds of the States Parties to the convention ratify the changes.
Turkmenistan was the first country to officially accept the proposed amendment, doing so on 22 September. Under the chairmanship of Mr. Dennis Flory, the group adopted a Final Report that recommended the extension of the scope of the CPPNM to cover, inter alia, the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport, and the protection of nuclear materials and facilities against sabotage.
However, the prepared text still contained a number of bracketed clauses on which the group was not able to reach agreement. In June, the IAEA Director General distributed the Final Report to the States Parties urging them to work rapidly towards consensus on the text in order to have a Diplomatic Conference to adopt the proposed amendments at an early date. During the meeting, the participants anticipated concluding the draft, but failed to agree on the methodology to incorporate Fundamental Principles of Physical Protection in the draft and the scope of sabotage and question of sanction for its environmental damage related to the international commission.
The working groups were separated into three topics: international standards, research and development, and training programs. It adopted a Final Report, in which the working group recommended the strengthening of the existing Convention by a well-defined amendment that would cover, among other topics, domestic use, storage and transport of nuclear material with the exclusion of nuclear material and nuclear facilities for military use, mandatory international oversight, periodic national reporting, peer reviews, and mandatory use of.
It also recommended drafting a resolution for the IAEA General Conference with the aim of strengthening the physical protection regime. The meeting concluded that an amendment to strengthen the Convention should be drafted and then be reviewed by the States Parties with the view to determine if it should be submitted to an amendment conference.
It also recommended that the IAEA Director-General convene a group of legal and technical experts to draft such an amendment. The meeting participants decided to establish five working sub-groups on different related matters, including illicit trafficking and physical protection assistance.
The Second Working Group meeting, convened on June, discussed five working papers related to the competency of the five working sub-groups established at the first meeting. In May, the Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NPT , in its Final Document, noted the paramount importance of effective physical protection of all nuclear material, the need for strengthened international cooperation in physical protection, and called on all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials.
The Conference urged all States that had not yet done so to adhere to the Convention by the earliest possible date and to apply, as appropriate, the recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities contained in IAEA document corrected and in other relevant guidelines. The Conference also welcomed the ongoing informal discussions among legal and technical experts, under the aegis of IAEA, to discuss whether there was a need to revise the Convention.
The meeting considered proposals by the United Kingdom, France Germany, Belgium, and Sweden to look more broadly at the question. The meeting concluded that the next meeting should be held in May , and before that, a working group should be established to make recommendations to the Expert Meeting.
They suggested that the Agency should consider the possibility of convening a meeting of interested States to address the issues involved in such a review. It was agreed that in case of sufficient support for such a meeting, it would be convened in They urged all States that had not yet done so to ratify the Convention at the earliest possible date.
The Review Conference unanimously expressed its full support for the Convention and urged all States to take action to become party to the Convention. The conference reaffirmed that the Convention provides a sound basis for the physical protection of the transport of nuclear material, the recovery and return of any stolen material, and the application of sanctions against any person who may commit criminal acts involving nuclear material.
It concluded that no changes were needed in the Convention. Share About The CPPNM is the only legally binding international agreement focusing on the physical protection of peaceful use nuclear materials. This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents.
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Leaders around the world and across the ideological spectrum agree that the global nonproliferation regime is facing a serious test. The emergence of sophisticated terrorist networks, black markets in nuclear technology, and technological leaps associated with globalization have conspired to threaten one of the most successful examples of international cooperation in history. The rampant proliferation of nuclear weapons that was predicted at the start of the nuclear age has been largely held in check and the use of those weapons avoided. Although experts readily concede that there exist many pathways to proliferation, the threat posed by the misuse of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle has received considerable recent attention. While the connection between nuclear energy and nonproliferation has been a topic of discussion since the dawn of the nuclear age, world events have brought the issue to the forefront once again. United States President George W. Bush and International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA Director General Mohammad ElBaradei are among those who have highlighted proliferation risks associated with civilian nuclear power programs and called for revitalizing the nuclear nonproliferation regime to address new threats.
Second, the paper will discuss the evolving philosophy behind the NSS, how Revision 5 fits within this structure, and the possible direction of future revisions of Revision 5 to fit this structure. Introduction The subject of nuclear security or, in the parlance of the nuclear industry, physical protection has taken on greater prominence over the last ten years since the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September demonstrated the willingness of terrorist groups to escalate to new scales of mass destruction. This was the largest gathering of world leaders convened by a US president since the end of World War II 1 , and resulted in an outcomes document with several important undertakings on securing nuclear materials. However, nuclear security is not new - nuclear operators, policy makers, regulators and the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA have been setting international standards for nuclear material and facilities since the early s. The first legally binding instrument dedicated to physical protection was the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material CPPNM , which was opened for signature in and came into force in The provisions contained within the CPPNM are high level and focussed primarily on what nuclear material to protect and what to report , rather than how to protect, and is primarily limited to international transport.